This article historicizes the legal regulation of sexuality and claims to sexual rights in South Africa and Zimbabwe, analyzing their implications. Focusing on the interaction of forma] Constitutions and informal customary law in the differential development of agency and rights, it highlights the constancy of women's partial legal subjectivity alongside shifts in authority from lineage to nation-state. The tensions between the legal formalism of rights, and the historical authority of customary structures buttress the regulation of sex and the claims to sexual rights within these two countries, and they frame a discussion of how sexualhealth programs and policies might better engage with the development of sexual agency. En este articulo, se hace una resefia historica de la regulaci?n legal de la sexualidad y las reivindicaciones de derechos sexuales en Sud?frica y en Zimbabwe, analizando las implicaciones para los derechos de g?nero como parte de la ciudadania en la ?poca post-colonial. Enfoc?ndose en la interacci?n de las Constituciones formales y la Ley informal y tradicional en el desarrollo diferenciada de ciudadania y derechos, el articulo destaca la manutenci?n de la subjetividad legal parcial de la mujer durante los cambios en el sistema de autoridad desde linaje hasta estadosnaciones. Esas tensiones entre el formalismo legal de derecho y la autoridad hist?rica de las estructuras tradicionales sirven de base para la regulaci?n del sexo y para los reclamos de derechos sexuales dentro de esos dos paises, y sirven de marco para una discusi?n acerca de la forma en que los programas y las politicas de salud sexual pueden interactuar m?s efectivamente con el desarrollo de un marco legal de respecto a la autonomia en el ejercicio de la sexualidad. homosexual's incorporation into the body of newly entitled citizens in South Africa and the homosexual's almost simultaneous extirpation from the national polity in Zimbabwe, Nambia, Zambia, Swaziland, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Botswana.l Within months of Zimbabwean President Mugabe's proclamation that "1 don't believe they (homosexuals) should have any rights at all," and the labeling of Zimbabwean homosexuals as the "festering finger endangering the body" that government must "chop off," South Africa became the first country in the world to ratify a constitution that included a prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.23 While neighboring states more or less replicated the Zimbabwean position, the distinctive inclusivity of the South African approach moved beyond the decriminalization of homosexual acts, encompassing more broadly the positive affirmation of equal rights for gays and lesbians in relation to employment benefits, adoption of children, and immigration through partnership.4 In addition, since that time the recognition of same-sex domestic partnerships is being formulated.5
homosexual's incorporation into the body of newly entitled citizens in South Africa and the homosexual's almost simultaneous extirpation from the national polity in Zimbabwe, Nambia, Zambia, Swaziland, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Botswana.l Within months of Zimbabwean President Mugabe's proclamation that "1 don't believe they (homosexuals) should have any rights at all," and the labeling of Zimbabwean homosexuals as the "festering finger endangering the body" that government must "chop off," South Africa became the first country in the world to ratify a constitution that included a prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.23 While neighboring states more or less replicated the Zimbabwean position, the distinctive inclusivity of the South African approach moved beyond the decriminalization of homosexual acts, encompassing more broadly the positive affirmation of equal rights for gays and lesbians in relation to employment benefits, adoption of children, and immigration through partnership. 4 In addition, since that time the recognition of same-sex domestic partnerships is being formulated. 5 As these measures deliver specific rights of formal equality and unsettle the gendered hierarchy so fundamental to exclusive heteronormativity, they are more than a symbolic inclusion of homosexuals into the social body. They contrast markedly with neighboring Zimbabwe's rejection of homosexuality as a "white man's disease" integral to the colonialist corruption of "traditional" African society. Elsewhere, I have analyzed the role this "whitewashing" of homosexuality played in discrediting the increased sexual autonomy of Zimbabwean women, positioning such autonomy as another alleged form of Western imperialism.6 Both the sexual inclusivity of citizenship in the new South Africa and the sexual exclusivity of citizenship in Zimbabwe are intrinsic to the gendered construction of notions of entitlement and belonging in these postcolonial states.
The ubiquity of sexuality and sexual rights in discussions of citizenship in both countries is not simply a result of the need to engage sexuality in strategic attempts to contain the spread of HIV/AIDS.7 This ubiquity is, moreover, an outcome of the current political and socio-historical trajectories of these two countries. In each case, sexuality has become integral to citizenship: it is explicitly recruited to serve as an index of national belonging in a way that, as this article demonstrates, goes beyond sexual orientation, behavior, or identity, to the very base of gender relations. Furthermore, HIV/AIDS is but one aspect of a multi-dimensional context rich with the conflicts, negotiations, and opportunities that characterize what are arguably revolutionary moments in the national histories of South Africa and Zimbabwe. The presence of HIV/AIDS increases, therefore, the already significant role of sexuality.
The analysis in this piece suggests that there is a real danger that an inadequate understanding of these national histories can lead well-intentioned sexual health interventions to unwittingly reproduce, and in so doing compound, the problems of historical context. Information alone is not enough to reduce women's disproportionate vulnerability to HIV/AIDS, as knowledge of risk does not automatically enable agency. The context through which agency is developed or constrained is defined by formal instruments of law and mapped out by informal mechanisms of social custom; analyzing the history of the ways in which these elements have interacted in Southern Africa suggests that addressing one part of this equation but not the other may well be dangerously counterproductive.
The transition out of a state of minority rule by white settlers took place 24 years ago in Zimbabwe and 10 years ago in South Africa. Enormous differences in contemporary contexts and procedural priorities have produced what are evidently very different approaches to human rights and governance. While there is obviously a complex multiplicity of historical, political, and cultural factors instrumental in defining the limits of citizenship and post-colonial identity, this article focuses on only two of the mechanisms that have framed the contrasting articulation of sexual rights in each of these states. Constitutions are the formal foundations of state power and circumscribe the different possibilities of policy in these two countries. Similarly, "traditional custom" is an informal but institutionalized mechanism of social regulation, and it is central to negotiating the tensions that exist between claims to cultural authenticity and aspirations to equality with regard to human rights. This article will restrict itself to a consideration of the interaction of these two elements (Constitution and custom) in these two states, whose different treatment of sexual relations is symbolically and practically central to their broader definitions of rights, subjectivity, and citizenship. Focusing on the relationship between the constitutional platform of a state and the customary relations of its society highlights the ways in which sexual hierarchies and gender relations become either entrenched or transformed in specifically post-colonial moments of fissure and reinvention.8
The Colonial Legacy of Gender and Rights
The contrasting treatment of both gendered and sexual rights (as well as broader issues of diversity and dissent) in present-day Zimbabwe and South Africa arises partly out of their different responses to a particular post-colonial dynamic. This dynamic consists of a tension between asserting, on the one hand, a "traditional" lineage-based culture that prioritizes interests presented as collective and invoked through claims to group rights and ethnic sovereignty, and, on the other hand, the political culture of a "modern" nation-state where individual autonomous citizens are entitled to rights of equality that are construed as universal.9 John Comaroff explains that the continuing prevalence of these contradictory registers of primal sovereignty and radical individualism derives from the colonial discourse of rights, which created "ethnic subjects, racinated and recast in an often antagonistic dialectic of construction and negation."'0 Indeed, this "antagonistic dialectic" is evident in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. In the Charter, these contradictory registers result in the articulation of not only individual rights and freedoms, but also group rights over the individual as well as individual duties to the collective to an extent not reflected in other international human rights treaties or conventions."1 For the purposes of this article, however, the most pertinent manifesta-tion of this "antagonistic dialectic" is the historical treatment of women living under African customary law in both colonial and post-colonial periods.
Research by Martin Chanock and others has shown how the colonial need for legal consistency and predictability effectively rigidified the contextual fluidity that had previously been the hallmark of African custom. 12 Systematizing diverse localized customs into one, uniformly applicable African Customary Law had the effect of displacing inherent mechanisms of accountability and entrenching gerontocratic and patriarchal relations of power. In the early colonial period, customary law became a pivotal tool in jockeying for position within the changing structures of African society. Chanock describes this as a battle "for the control of labor in the changing conditions of the rural economy," with specific reference to the labor of wives, their offspring, and the rights to the fruits of those labors. '3 Older patriarchs attempted to sustain their traditional position of authority in the face of the growing economic power of younger wage-earning men, while women were forced to become increasingly innovative in gaining access to the few informal and unofficial means by which they had earlier been able to exercise power.14 A review of the development of laws around marriage and adultery in colonial Rhodesia makes clear that the people testifying to colonial authorities about the content of customary laws are predominantly elder men of standing within their communities.'5 This is unsurprising given the gerontocratic and patriarchal social structures of these communities and given the similarly hierarchical structure of the colonial authorities' society. Moreover, any initial desire on the part of the colonial authorities to emancipate African women from what they perceived to be "primitive" and oppressive structures of kinship was rapidly replaced by a recognition that their authority was based on the cooperation of African chiefs and headmen. 16 For this reason, some of the early colonial laws impacting directly on women and their sexual independence evince Comaroff's "anatagonistic dialectic of construction and negation": they demonstrate precisely the tension HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 87 between definitions of personhood that were located in lineage and collective identity, and definitions of emancipated individual subjectivity that adhere to the modern state.
The earliest legislative product of this initial emancipatory concern was the Native Marriage Ordinance (NMO) of 1901. This ordinance had the dual and sometimes contradictory aims of constructing a legal framework to support African marriages while also preventing African women from being forced into marriage. It immediately bestowed on women a measure of potential autonomy from men who, under customary law, were perpetually their legal guardians:
The African idea that sexual identity [behavior] was an aspect of lineage membership, and that individual members were answerable to the family group for the uses they made of their sexuality, was undermined at a stroke by the Ordinance's provision that no woman should be made to marry against her will. The women's rights were Ironically, this shift from lineage to state regulation was subsequently compounded by the attempts of chiefs and their headmen to use the colonial law to bring women back into their control. In persuading the colonial authorities to pass the Native Adultery Punishment Ordinance (NAPO) of 1916, African patriarchs specifically prohibited married African women from an act that was permitted for anyone else, penalizing exclusively and specifically the errantmarried woman.19 While this ordinance was aimed at disempowering and restricting women, it also brought African women's particular social status increasingly within the realm of legal regulation. Implicitly, it constituted in law the criminality of African women's sexual autonomy, initiating a partial legal subjectivity that extended no further than women's capacity to be disciplined. That is, women were treated as legal subjects in that they could be disciplined for committing the offence of adultery, but they did not have the subjective legal status to be offended by a man's adulterous behavior, nor did they have any further capacity to act in law other than through their male guardian. Nevertheless, in constituting the criminality of women's sexual autonomy, the NAPO implicitly relied on a notion of women's independent action and their specific responsibility for this agency. Similarly, while the NMO affirmed a regime of marriage in which woman had no legal subjectivity other than as offenders/adulterers, it simultaneously protected women from being pledged in marriage. In each case, the transfer out of lineage and into state control was predicated on a shift from the power of the patriarch to the rights and obligations of an individual; but in reality it transferred onto women a partial subjectivity that was expedient for maintaining traditional relations of power.20 This subjectivity was partial in two senses: first, it was a negative subjectivity, as it was restricted to giving women the status to be arrested as offenders. And second, it was an incomplete subjectivity: as women had no legal standing of their own (they could only operate in law through a male guardian), it did not deliver direct or proper recourse to the protection offered by the law. But it was also expedient as it was invested in women "solely as adjuncts to the group, means to the anachronistic end of clan survival, rather than as valuable in themselves."'21
The lingering historical effects of this partial subjectivity are the source of many of the conflicts around gender and sexuality in contemporary Southern Africa. The concept of a sexuality rooted in the self rather than in lineage and family is the basis of the sexual-autonomy claims fomenting Southern African anxieties around both homosexuality and women's sexual agency. Similarly, in relation to such things as rape, while there is some recognition in common law of women's legal subjectivity, customary law continues to temper women's ability to exercise any full legal subjectivity.22 It is precisely this tension between the "traditional" lineage-based subjugation of African women to their guardians (primal sovereignty) and the contrary notion of the individual subjectivity of a legal person (radical individualism-arguably fundamental to claiming human rights) that pushes and pulls the vacillating attempts of the Zimbabwean government to initially empower and then restrain women.23 There is a crippling ambivalence in developing the notion of individual rights while at the same time promoting "traditional" family structures and the priority of customary law. Yet, South African attempts to overcome this ambivalence have not been unequivocally successful, in large part because the legacy of women's partial subjectivity is so deeply embedded in discourses of sexuality.
Constitutional Frameworks and Customary Law
In South Africa, the drafting and adoption of a new Constitution was the "primary objective" of multi-party negotiations that lasted nearly four years.24 An entirely new Constitution was necessary to ensure the abolition of a system that was beyond reform. Apartheid systematized inequalities through separation, differentiation, and the explicit provision of partial subjectivities according to race. For the vast majority of South Africans, their race gave them the strong possibility of becoming offenders in law while simultaneously restricting their agency in or recourse to law as an instrument of protection and rights. The new Constitution explicitly premises itself on "diversity," clearly stating that differences between people should never again be used as a force of division and should rather be seen as a positive asset in building a strong democracy.25 This is a principle enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, which contains the Equality Clause, implicitly rebuking partial subjectivities as it prohibits discrimination "on any one or more grounds including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, color, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, be- The government's evident disinterest in having a Constitution that provides a platform for women's equality is further affirmed by the failure of the Constitution to include both sex and gender in its list of prohibited grounds of discrimination. In 1996, the 14th amendment to the Constitution removed "sex" from this list and replaced it with "gender." Previously, while discrimination on the grounds of biological sex was prohibited, discrimination on the grounds of gender was not, so that even those women who were living under civil law were vulnerable to the many gender stereotypes of socio-cultural origin that underpin discrimination. Subsequent to the 1996 amendment, discrimination on anatomical or biological grounds (e.g., pregnancy, menstruation, childbirth, lactation, or physical attributes) was no longer prohibited by the Constitution. This fudging stands in marked contrast to the careful articulation of so many different forms of discrimination in South Africa's Equality Clause, and, as the Zimbabwean amendment was enacted after the South African Constitution, it is unlikely that the Zimbabwean drafters and legislators were unaware of the distinction between sex and gender. The Supreme Court has not yet been required to provide any interpretive guidance on this issue; but the possibility that they could provide a wide interpretation that includes both sex and gender is remote. First, because such an interpretation is far removed from the clear and direct implication of an amendment that explicitly replaces sex with gender (demonstrating a concerted consideration of what might be the distinction between the two terms); and second, because the new Supreme Court bench is now more amenable to direction from the government, which drafted the amendment in the first place. Zimbabwean women witnessed their government's flirtation with a move to gender equality in the years immediately following Independence, only to find it subsequently retracted with growing censure of independent women. During the 1980s, the state carried out random street cleanups in major urban areas of any women found to be without a marriage certificate or proof of employment-an action whose objectives were replicated in the 1990's when mobs of men stripped women naked in the street for wearing mini-skirts that were "too short."47,48 In all of these cases, the harassment of women was justified by their denunciation as mahure (prostitutes), a word frequently used to describe women who display economic independence or, most particularly, sexual autonomy. The narrow confines of respectability were outlined in the early 1980s by the then Zimbabwean Minister of Home Affairs who suggested that the abolition of lobola (bride wealth) would "legalize prostitution" as "a woman for whom lobola was not paid could easily move to another man."49 Such "traditional" resistance to the mere possibility of women's sexual autonomy explains why homosexuality presents such a challenge to customary relations. Accepting lesbianism implies that women can (and might choose to) survive without men, let alone without men as their guardian, a "problem" compounded by the fact that a lesbian will bring no lobola into the family, thereby affecting the ability of her brothers to pay for their own wives and un-dermining the economic base of reproductive culture. This is a direct illustration of the conflict between the register of primal sovereignty, whereby sexual relations are defined in relation to lineage, and individual rights, whereby sexual relations are the distinct manifestation of individual autonomous choice.
A woman's ability to choose her partner is a precondition for her recognition as a fully entitled legal subject and locates her sexual independence at the center of broader structures of social and economic power. The refusal of this independent choice has been at the root of women's sustained partial subjectivity and was a source of the recent concern about homosexuality in Zimbabwe. The denigration of homosexuals invariably invoked cultural signifiers to depict them as foreign to Zimbabwean culture, thereby relating the issue specifically to the register of primal sovereignty and suggesting that homosexuality was being imposed at western insistence: "Homosexuality is unnatural and there is no question ever of allowing these people to behave worse than dogs and pigs....
What we are being persuaded to accept is sub-animal behavior and we will never allow it here."50-52 This statement was made in Shona, which gives "dogs" (imbwa) particular idiomatic significance consistent with Mugabe's calls for a return to "our traditional values that make us human beings."53 He thereby invokes notions of ubuntu (or munhu in Shona) that refer to Africanist conceptions that the humanity of individuals is derived from the society around them and makes explicit his reliance on the register of primal sovereignty.54 At issue, however, is not so much his reliance on these notions, but his interpretation of them in such a way as to leave little space for individual rights. While this interpretative strategy is clearly supported by the Zimbabwean Constitution, it is quite different from that emerging under the South African Constitution.55
In South Africa, distinguishing "living" customary law from the "formal" customary law that was constructed in the colonial encounter (as outlined earlier) allows customary law to be critically reappraised and reproduced in a more organic, rights-receptive form. Similarly, the South African Recognition of Customary Marriages Act gives women full majority status and the right to acquire property in their own names, thereby recognizing the value of customary law in many people's lives while formally removing the constraints of women's partial subjectivity. Predictably, the new Constitution has also fostered a considerable amount of equality legislation of direct application to all women, while the Constitutional Court has delivered a number of judgments affirming formal rights of equality for same-sex couples.59,60 A more recent Constitutional Court ruling, however, provides an indication of the limits of sexual autonomy and individual rights in the new South Africa. In the case of Jordan, the majority judgment found that where the Sexual Offences Act criminalized sex workers but not their clients (sex purchasers), there was no gender discrimination as the prohibition on prostitution applied to both men and women sex workers.61,62 While Justices O'Regan and Sachs dissented from the majority finding on this question of gender discrimination, all Justices of the Court were unanimously agreed that the prohibition of sex work was consistent with the Constitutional rights to privacy, dignity, freedom, security of the person, and economic activity, and that its decriminalization was a matter for the legislature rather than the Constitutional Court.
This seems an unusually cautious and restrained approach for the Constitutional Court to take with regard to HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS its law-making role. The failure of the Court to recognize sex workers (acknowledged to be predominantly women) as frequently representative of the most marginalized groups in society is surprising, as it is they who are most desperately in need and most explicitly deprived of rights (social, economic, civil, and political). There are persuasive publichealth arguments for decriminalization, and it is arguable that these are also the logical extension of many of the Constitution's founding principles. But these arguments depend on the effective removal of sexuality and law from a discourse of morality and the adoption of a framework of health, harm reduction, worker's rights, and pleasure (as opposed to reproduction).
The For this very reason, in a context of practical inequality and gendered impoverishment, the limits of formal Constitutional rights might be measured through the failure of policies to address the continuation of women's reduced sexual agency and disproportionate vulnerability to HIV infection in South Africa.70 It is here that the Constitution can serve as an "enabling tool," providing a platform from which attempts to challenge HIV/AIDS can be launched, but its effect will still be limited without good governance.
An explicit example of this is the reliance on the Constitutional provision of socio-economic rights that enabled activists to successfully develop the call for access to anti-retroviral treatment. Despite its obdurate reticence, the government has been obliged to initiate new policies and commit itself to a national treatment program. The extent to which the government eventually executes a "national" program is still in question, and effective policy is still dependent on good implementation; but litigation, including some in the Constitutional Court, has been pivotal in obliging the government to make a commitment to a national treatment program official policy. 71 The possibilities of agency reflected in this active intervention in the process of policy formation and implementation rely on the premise that the Constitutional Court has the authority to exercise jurisdiction over the government. As has been demonstrated earlier, this is an assumption that one cannot make in the context of Zimbabwe, where the government has perceived itself to be in conflict with its Court and Constitution. Consequently, attempts to challenge the policies of the Zimbabwean government as unconstitutional have been repeatedly unsuccessful, casting the possibilities of the South African Constitution in an ever-more resplendent light.
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that another indication of the limits of the formal equality of Constitutional provision is that South Africa still has an extraordinarily high rate of sexual violence, to the extent that some researchers label it as "systemic."72 But in South Africa, there is at least official recognition of this problem, some (if inadequate) attempts on the part of the State to engage with it, and a Constitutional platform around which to locate strategic objectives.73 In Zimbabwe, the current political context includes a dramatic rise in reports of sexual violence. There are widespread reports, for instance, of coercive sex being used explicitly as an instrument of torture by state-sponsored militia in attacks upon the opposition and suspected sympathizers.74 Far from attempting to prevent sexual violence, however, reports like these and the resulting impunity suggest that the Zimbabwean government appears to license such violence. Such an instrumental usage of sex would be less likely if there were a more developed context of women's subjectivity, making them fully entitled citizens with recourse to legal equality. If women's identity were not thought to derive so directly from their attachment to men, their physical integrity might not represent a terrain of such appropriation. But when considered in conjunction with South Africa's "systemic" problem of sexual violence, it seems clear that the attempts and interventions of sexual-health policy to "empower" women have not been able to protect them from a level of base violence greater and more concerted than ever. Alternatively, it is arguable that the success of policy interventions aimed at developing women's agency in South Africa might be measured by greater levels of reporting of sexual violence, though there is no way of discovering this with any certainty. Either way, it is clear that the broader context of gender inequalities has to be addressed in order to properly develop the concept and reality of sexual agency, and that the Constitutional framework in South Africa provides a starting point that is not present in Zimbabwe. The contrast between these situations therefore suggests that while it is important to acknowledge the limits inherent in the formalism of Constitutional rights, a strong and effective Constitution can provide a platform for popular interventions in democratic governance and the development of political agency.
Conclusion
The formal recognition of equal rights, then, is not so immediate and omnipotent a recipe as to provide all South African women with an indisputable agency that all Zimbabwean women are perpetually denied. That is too simplistic. There are many women in South Africa whose lives remain relatively unchanged by the primarily bourgeois petitions that have been made to the Constitutional Court, and there are similarly women in Zimbabwe who manage to engage a sexual agency unanticipated by the register of primal sovereignty. But in both states, those women who do manage to exercise some real control over sexual choices (as they will in practice) may well do so through resorting to unofficial or even illegal methods that will generally entail disproportionate responsibility taken without recourse to structural support.75 Current attempts to promote women's sexual agency through health interventions will stumble without parallel attempts to undo the partiality that constrains women's legal and social subjectivity in a broader context. Sexual agency depends on the ability to exercise agency in the ordinary contexts that surround the sexual. Such agency cannot, alas, be conjured by an expression of will or desire. We cannot simply wish it into being, even if by consensus, as we first need to undo the obstacles that inhibit its development and restructure the habits, patterns, and cultural institutions that are built on its absence. Interventions that attempt to invoke women's sexual agency without first developing a social context that fosters its operation are in danger of replicating the contrary consequences of this partia] subjectivity once more, as they expose women to increased, possibly violent, censure in their unsupported attempts to exercise sexual agency. Programs and policies aiming to promote women's sexual agency therefore have a clear and unavoidable responsibility to challenge an interpretation of custom that reproduces women's partial subjectivity. The ability to negotiate safer sex, for example, is severely circumscribed when the context in which consent is given is based in inequality.
The examples of Zimbabwe and South Africa suggest that Constitutional provisions can be a key determinant of this broader context, either supporting or surpassing the partial subjectivity that contributes to women's disproportionate vulnerability to HIV/AIDS. This is primarily be-cause the Constitutions of these two countries engage very differently with the contrary registers of radical individualism and primal sovereignty and so establish very different platforms from which to develop and support women's agency. The South African Constitution clearly resolves the tension between rights and cultural authenticity through the notion of "living" custom. It ushers in a legal framework conducive to initiating the development of women's sexual agency. In contrast, the Zimbabwean situation illustrates the extent to which a constitution that has neither symbolic strength nor the practical advantage of an unambiguous dedication to human rights can serve to exacerbate inequities of sex and gender.
Interventions in HIV/AIDS and sexual health more broadly cannot shy away from the implications of this. It is not enough to pay lip-service to the notion of women's agency while colluding in maintaining the structures that block the development of that agency. To be effective in the long term, these programs must challenge those traditional structures of customary relations that produce the partial subjectivity of women if they are to reduce women's vulnerability to HIV/AIDS. 22. When a man rapes a woman, under common law the state assumes the burden of prosecuting the individual offender and on conviction it is he personally who is punished. But under customary law, the heads of the families will negotiate a settlement to compensate for damages; and while the compensation relates to the woman's value (as determined by bridewealth), her lack of legal subjectivity in this regime means that any damages paid are given to her husband (or, if she is unmarried, her father or brother or other appropriate male guardian) or to the family as a whole; the underlying principle of restitution may even require the man to marry the victim. While in practice many women will have some active participation in this process, there is no guarantee of this at all. Even if restitution has been agreed upon between the families, the state still has a duty to prosecute, leading convicted offenders frequently to complain that they are being punished twice for the same offence. However, it is arguable that under common law the restrictive definitions of rape and the constraints of procedure specific to rape trials place additional constraints on the victim's recourse to law. 
